Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks
Most recent ad hoc network research has focused on providing routing services without considering security. In this paper, we detail security threats against ad hoc routing protocols, speciﬁcally examining AODV and DSR. In light of these threats, we identify three different environments with distinct security requirements. We propose a solution to one, the managed-open scenario where no network infrastructure is pre-deployed, but a small amount of prior security coordination is expected. Our protocol, ARAN, is based on certiﬁcates and successfully defeats all identiﬁed attacks.
Ad hoc wireless networks assume no pre-deployed infrastructure is available for routing packets end-to-end in a network, and instead rely on intermediary peers. Securing ad hoc routing presents challenges because each user brings to the network their own mobile unit, without the centralized policy or control of a traditional network. Many ad hoc routing protocols have been proposed previously [9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 3], but none of the proposals have deﬁned security requirements, and all inherently trust all participants. In this paper, we demonstrate exploits that are possible against ad hoc routing protocols, deﬁne various security environments, and offer a secure solution with an authenticated routing protocol. We detail the exploits against two protocols that are under consideration by the IETF for standardization: the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol (AODV)  and the Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) . AODV and DSR are efﬁcient in terms of network performance, but they allow attackers to easily advertise falsi- ﬁed route information, to redirect routes, and to launch denialof-service attacks.
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