Virtual Machine Introspection Based Architecture for Intrusion Detection
Todays architectures for intrusion detection force the IDS designer to make a difﬁcult choice. If the IDS resides on the host, it has an excellent view of what is happening in that host’s software, but is highly susceptible to attack. On the other hand, if the IDS resides in the network, it is more resistant to attack, but has a poor view of what is happening inside the host, making it more susceptible to evasion. In this paper we present an architecture that retains the visibility of a host-based IDS, but pulls the IDS outside of the host for greater attack resistance. We achieve this through the use of a virtual machine monitor. Using this approach allows us to isolate the IDS from the monitored host but still retain excellent visibility into the host’s state. The VMM also offers us the unique ability to completely mediate interactions between the host software and the underlying hardware. We present a detailed study of our architecture, including Livewire, a prototype implementation. We demonstrate Livewire by implementing a suite of simple intrusion detection policies and using them to detect real attacks.
Widespread study and deployment of intrusion detection systems has led to the development of increasingly sophisticated approaches to defeating them. Intrusion detection systems are defeated either through attack or evasion. Evading an IDS is achieved by disguising malicious activity so that the IDS fails to recognize it, while attacking an IDS involves tampering with the IDS or components it trusts to prevent it from detecting or reporting malicious activity. Countering these two approaches to defeating intrusion detection has produced conﬂicting requirements. On one hand, directly inspecting the state of monitored systems provides better visibility. Visibility makes evasion more difﬁcult by increasing the range of analyzable events , decreasing the risk of having an incorrect view of system state, and reducing the number of unmonitored avenues of attack. On the other hand, increasing the visibility of the target system to the IDS frequently comes at the cost of weaker isolation between the IDS and attacker. This increases the risk of a direct attack on the IDS. Nowhere is this trade-off more evident than when comparing the dominant IDS architectures: network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) that offer high attack resistance at the cost of visibility, and host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) that offer high visibility but sacriﬁce attack resistance. In this paper we present a new architecture for building intrusion detection systems that provides good visibility into the state of the monitored host, while still providing strong isolation for the IDS, thus lending signiﬁcant resistance to both evasion and attack. Our approach leverages virtual machine monitor (VMM) technology. This mechanism allows us to pull our IDS “outside” of the host it is monitoring, into a completely different hardware protection domain, providing a high-conﬁdence barrier between the IDS and an attacker’s malicious code. The VMM also provides the ability to directly inspect the hardware state of the virtual machine that a monitored host is running on. Consequently, we can retain the visibility beneﬁts provided by a host-based intrusion detection system. Finally, the VMM provides the ability to interpose at the architecture interface of the monitored host, yielding even better visibility than normal OS-level mechanisms by enabling monitoring of both hardware and software level events. This ability to interpose at the hardware interface also allows us to mediate interactions between the hardware and the host software, allowing to us to perform both intrusion detection and hardware access control. As we will discuss later, this additional control over the hardware lends our system further attack resistance
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